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CRIMINAL LAW CASE NOTES AND COMMENTS

crime committed four days previous, and he was
subsequently found guilty. When the defendant
was released from a Texas prison in February,
1954, New York authorities returned him to a
New York prison. The New York parole board
determined that since the defendant committed a
felony in another state while on parole, he would
have to serve the maximum time remaining on
his original sentence and would not be given credit
for the time between his date of parole and subsequent delinquency. The Court of Appeals of
New York affirmed, with three judges dissenting,
the denial of the defendant's petition of habeas
corpus, and held that a delinquent parolee is
subject to the statutory penalty for committing a
felony in another state while on parole. People v.
Murphy, 2 N.Y.2d 163, 143 N.E.2d 910 (1957).
The court was faced with the construction of
two sections of the New York Correction Law.
Section 218 provided that when the parole board
has reasonable cause to believe a parolee has
violated his parole, the board should declare the
parolee delinquent and the time owed will date
from the declaration of the delinquency. The
other section was 219, and it provided that if a
person "on parole" commits a crime in another
state, that would be a felony if committed in
New York, the time owed will date from the day
of parole to the expiration of the maximum sentence given the parolee. The court, in construing
the effect of both sections, determined that the
sections were not related and were concerned with
different situations. According to the court,
section 218 dealt with "a mere violation of parole
and the power of the board to act in such an
instance." Section 219, however, was said to deal
with an entirely different situation and limited to
"the prisoner's commission and conviction of a

felony while 'on parole' and the effect thereof upon
his future confinement." The court thus rejected
the defendant's contention that since he had been
declared a delinquent parolee prior to the time he
committed the felony, he was no longer "on parole"
at such time and thus not subject to the provisions
of section 219. The court felt that it would be
incongruous for the law to favor a person who has
been declared a delinquent parolee and then
commits a felony, over a non-delinquent parolee
who commits a felony.
The dissent pointed out that many New York
cases have developed the concept that after a
parolee has been declared delinquent, "his status
is changed from that of a parolee to an escaped
convict." Also, after the declaration of delinquency, the parole board loses custody of the
convict, and his sentence does not begin to run
again until he is returned to prison. Thus, since
only the sentence of a person "on parole" runs
while he is not in prison, a delinquent parolee
is not "on parole", according to the dissent. In
addition, the dissent felt that when the majority
construed the legislative language found in section
219, "while on parole", the language was converted
to mean "after his parole has terminated." The
dissent stated that the court had no right to do
this. The dissent also stated that to say that
sections 218 and 219 deal with different situations
is to "disregard reality." The dissent commented
that both sections were enacted together. The
dissent maintained that the majority approach
encourages parole boards to allow delinquent
parolees to remain at large and thus endanger
society.
(For other recent case abstracts see "Police Science
Legal Abstracts tnd Notes", infra pp. 573-574).

